The EquiFlow vault holds tokenized stocks pledged by thousands of borrowers. Every line that touches vault.pledge() or vault.borrow() has been audited twice. We'd rather pay you to find the bug than read about it on Twitter. Submit via Immunefi, encrypted, with a working PoC.
Severity follows Immunefi's vulnerability classification. Final payout is scaled by economic impact, exploitability, and quality of disclosure.
| Severity | Reward range · USDG | Visual | Example findings |
|---|---|---|---|
Critical | $250,000 – $1,000,000 | up to $1.00M | Theft of user funds, permanent freezing of vault collateral, infinite USDG mint, oracle manipulation draining a market. |
High | $50,000 – $250,000 | up to $250K | Theft of yield, temporary freezing of vault for >24h, bypass of liquidation bonus, governance vote manipulation under quorum. |
Medium | $10,000 – $50,000 | up to $50K | Griefing that costs users >$10K, DoS of a single oracle adapter, fee accounting drift, accessor bypass on view-only methods. |
Low | $2,500 – $10,000 | up to $10K | Off-by-one rounding in interest accrual, frontend phishing surface, gas griefing, minor event-emission mismatches. |
Informational | $500 – $2,500 | up to $3K | Best-practice deviations, missing input validation that cannot be reached, hardcoded magic numbers, doc/inline-comment mismatches. |
Source is open. Run forge tests against the testnet fork before submitting.
| Contract | Address · explorer | Audit | Scope notes |
|---|---|---|---|
EquiFlowVault src/vault/EquiFlowVault.sol · 2,840 LOC | 0x7c4F12a1…B30002 view on explorer ↗ | AUDITED Trail of Bits · OpenZeppelin | Pledge / borrow / repay / withdraw / liquidate paths. Interest model. Risk param storage. All non-view entrypoints. |
USDGStable src/stable/USDGStable.sol · 720 LOC | 0x91a2c4Ff…F90123 view on explorer ↗ | AUDITED OpenZeppelin · Spearbit | Mint authority gating, pause hooks, blocklist behavior, ERC-20 invariants. Off-chain reserve attestation is OUT of scope. |
OracleAdapter src/oracle/PythAdapter.sol · 612 LOC | 0x33dF8a2b…3a2B11 view on explorer ↗ | AUDITED Trail of Bits · Zellic | Pyth pull-update verification, staleness guard, circuit-breaker thresholds, fallback feed routing. |
SmartAccountFactory src/aa/SmartAccountFactory.sol · 540 LOC | 0x00170f8A…F4d5B2 view on explorer ↗ | AUDITED OpenZeppelin | ERC-4337 account deployment, session-key permissioning, paymaster gating, signature validation paths. |
Submissions of these will be marked invalid and closed. They do not count against your validity ratio if it's your first one, but repeats will lead to program-level rate limiting.
Fork the testnet, run the forge suite, identify a violated invariant. We publish the full invariant list in docs/SECURITY.md — every one of them is a paid finding if you break it.
Bundle the PoC, root-cause writeup, and fix recommendation. Encrypt under the EquiFlow Labs PGP key (fingerprint 4A2C 91DE … 9013). Plaintext disclosures are not accepted.
File the encrypted payload at immunefi.com/bounty/equiflow. Include a Robinhood Chain testnet tx hash demonstrating the exploit. Optional: anonymous handle for payout.
We acknowledge within 24h, propose a severity within 72h, and pay within 14 days of fix-deploy. You get final approval on the public writeup. Confidential indefinitely if you prefer.
Names appear with researcher consent only. Anonymous payouts are routed via Immunefi and not listed here.
| Rank | Researcher | Lifetime payout | Valid reports | Highest finding |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| #1 | researcher-1 | $480K | 3 | Critical · USDG mint bypass |
| #2 | researcher-2 | $313K | 5 | Critical · oracle staleness window |
| #3 | researcher-3 | $184K | 4 | High · liquidation bonus drain |
| #4 | researcher-4 | $142K | 7 | High · session-key escalation |
| #5 | researcher-5 | $95K | 6 | Medium · interest accrual drift |
| #6 | researcher-6 | $68K | 4 | Medium · paymaster gas griefing |
| #7 | researcher-7 | $53K | 3 | Medium · accessor bypass |
We follow the Immunefi standard. Researchers who act in good faith and within scope have full legal protection from EquiFlow Labs and the DAO, and will be indemnified against third-party claims arising from their disclosure.
EquiFlow Labs, the EquiFlow DAO, and any subsidiary will not initiate or support legal action against security researchers acting in good faith under this policy. We grant you safe harbor for: accessing testnet contracts, transferring no more value than necessary to demonstrate the issue, and disclosing in private to our triage team first.
In exchange, we ask that you do not publicly disclose a vulnerability before a fix is live in production, do not attempt to access or modify another user's funds beyond what is strictly necessary for a proof of concept, and do not exploit the bug for personal gain. Sharing the vulnerability with any third party before disclosure forfeits your reward.
Live reports are redacted until a fix is shipped. Resolved reports include the full root-cause analysis once disclosed.
| ID | Submitted | Severity | Title | Status | Researcher | Reward |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EQ-2026-117 | 3 days ago | — | ███ CONFIDENTIAL · IN TRIAGE ███ | IN TRIAGE | [redacted] | pending |
| EQ-2026-116 | 8 days ago | — | ███ CONFIDENTIAL · IN TRIAGE ███ | IN TRIAGE | [redacted] | pending |
| EQ-2026-114 | 27 days ago | CRITICAL | USDG mint bypass via reentrant pledge in same block | RESOLVED | researcher-1 | +$480K |
| EQ-2026-112 | 41 days ago | HIGH | Liquidation bonus paid twice when liquidator == borrower | RESOLVED | researcher-3 | +$132K |
| EQ-2026-109 | 62 days ago | HIGH | Oracle staleness window allows stale-feed liquidation on TSLA | RESOLVED | researcher-2 | +$175K |